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What objective should an entrepreneur focus on when starting a new business 
enterprise? Both a survival orientation and a profit one are important for the continuity of the 
new venture, but a survival focus is key in the hazardous early months or even years. In this 
thesis, I identify the conditions under which an entrepreneur should switch from a survival 
orientation, where the venture’s likelihood of survival is more critical, to a profit orientation 
where the venture’s profit instead is more critical. 
I accomplish this task by determining the optimal time to switch from a survival to a 
profit orientation based on maximizing the entrepreneur’s accumulated utility over a given 
time horizon. At each time period, the utility is positively associated with the amount of added 
value to the business venture that entrepreneur owns and manages, and the time horizon is 
determined by the time at which the entrepreneur’s venture exit – for instance, it is being sold. 
That added value contains a planned portion (e.g., due to what the entrepreneur can control) 
and an unplanned portion. The portion of a firm’s added value that is unplanned depends on 
the entrepreneur’s orientation, whereby, at any time period, the expected added value and its 
variation are considered to be low under a survival orientation, but they are considered to be 
high under a profit orientation. I use an approach from the economics literature, known as the 
LEN model, where the use of an exponential utility function (E), a linear relationship between 
the utility and random effects (L), and normality of those random effects (N) allow me to 
transfer the probabilistic objective function into a certainty equivalent that makes the problem 
tractable.  
The decision framework and its resulting findings suggest two environmental and two 
entrepreneurial characteristics that influence the existence of a time at which to switch 
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orientation from survival to profit. Based on these characteristics, I derive sixteen scenarios 
and discussed some of the necessary conditions for the existence of a switching time. I find 
that it is not straightforward to determine whether the orientation switch should be delayed or 
expedited as business environments (or entrepreneurial types) are compared. I thus further 
develop my analysis by adding more structure to the functional forms that underline the 
behavior of how the mean of and variation in the firm’s added value are regulated over time, 
as well as for the risk propensity of the firm’s owner. This exercise allow me to study the 
conditions under which the switching time should be delayed or expedited, and to numerically 
investigate the behavior of a firm’s total valuation as changes occur in key model parameters.  
I use franchising as an application of the sensitivity analysis I perform to identify 
whether a change in a model parameter (everything else being equal) should delay or expedite 
the orientation switch. Based on this application, I would advise entrepreneurs to switch their 
orientation later if they go into entrepreneurship as a franchisee rather than as a franchisor. A 
simulation analysis allows me to further propose a positive relationship between a firm’s total 
valuation and the planned added value by the entrepreneur to that firm. That analysis also 
suggests a positive relationship between a firm’s total valuation and the expected unplanned-
added-value growth under a profit orientation, but a negative relationship under a survival 
orientation. Further, I find a positive relationship between total valuation and the variation in 
unplanned-added-value growth under a survival orientation, but a negative relationship under 
a profit orientation. 
One of the key challenges that have been raised for future entrepreneurship research is 
how to define an entrepreneur’s objective function. My thesis contributes to this debate by 
suggesting that, in the early years, there should be an orientation switch, that is, sequentially 
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as opposed to simultaneously consider both survival and profit maximization. My thesis also 
contributes to the literature on firm growth because using risk-return tradeoffs to characterize 
the two orientations is unique in the entrepreneurial context, and so is the consideration of a 
sequential use of these orientations to study firm added value over time and the resulting 
accumulated total valuation. Characterizing each of the two orientations – survival and profit 
– based on risk-return tradeoffs and linking these orientations to firm growth open up new 
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Entrepreneurs enter their selected markets in pursuit of profitability. Although it seems 
to be a reasonable goal, Schaffer (1989) suggests that it may not be a rational economic 
behavior for new business enterprises. Gilbert et al. (2006) point out that, with enough 
stability, profit maximization can be a justifiable goal for more established firms, but Storey 
(2000) argues that entrepreneurs involved in startups, instead, worry about the likelihood of 
survival of their new ventures. Startup owners are concerned about remaining in the market 
and trying to avoid bankruptcy. For instance, in Canada only 50% of new enterprises survive 
for three years, and only 20% survive for a decade (Baldwin et al., 2000). In the US, Headd 
(2003) maintains that failure rates are as high as 30% over the first two years of operations.  
However, those that survive and grow become eventually able to think beyond 
survival. Then, a key decision is the timing at which an entrepreneur should switch from 
maximizing the venture’s likelihood of survival to maximizing its profitability. In other 
words, when should there be a switch from a survival orientation to a profit orientation. This 
thesis theoretically addresses this question. 
The identification of the right orientation is critical to a new firm. Dutta et al. (2001) 
design a model consisting of two diverse groups of firms where the firms in the first group 
exhibit a survival orientation and those in the second group a profit orientation. Given these 
two objective functions, they investigate the wealth controlled by each segment and show 
that, in equilibrium, the profit-oriented group, although smaller than the survival-oriented 
group, dominates in terms of wealth-controlled shares. In an earlier study, Schaffer (1989) 
maintained that whether or not a firm chooses to be profit oriented heavily depends on its 
dominance in the market. The selected objective function can also determine the role played 
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by shareholders in the firm’s investment decisions. Stockhammer (2006) argue that 
shareholders’ strategies are often associated with reduced investment and reduced outputs, but 
increased profits. Moreover, switching orientation (from survival to profit maximization) at a 
suboptimal time can be fatal to a new firm because the switch may, for instance, increase 
production beyond the firm’s capacity, raise prices before the market is ready, and/or force 
the firm to invest prematurely in new products (Gaskill et al. 1993). 
To date, the literature has mostly considered profit maximization and survival 
maximization as two distinct orientations (as in, e.g., Radner 1995, Dutta et al. 2001). In other 
words, that stream of work has investigated the differences in firm behavior under either 
orientation. Although a few scholars have considered both orientations simultaneously (e.g., 
Choi et al. 2008), the present thesis offers a new point of view in that both profit and survival 
orientations are considered in the firm’s growth process, yet sequentially. 
I thus offer a utility-maximization framework where the owner of a startup firm 
wishes to establish the best time at which to switch orientation from survival to profitability. 
In line with Jensen (2002), who suggests that a firm’s decisions be made so as to maximize 
that firm’s market value, the owner optimizes her total utility until the firm exit (e.g., through 
a sell or a buyout), where, at any given time period, the higher the added value of the firm is, 
the higher the owner’s utility. The firm’s added value depends on the risk-return tradeoff 
faced by the owner and therefore on her orientation (i.e., being a survival maximizer versus a 
profit maximizer). In later years, the firm faces more fortune and, as a result, it can afford to 
take higher risks (Shapira and March 1992, Walls et al. 1996), which in turn is associated with 
higher financial returns (Lin et al. 1974, Walls et al. 1996, Raynor 2007). Consequently, in 
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my decision framework, a survival orientation yields both lower risk and lower return than 
does a profit orientation.  
By gaining a better understanding of the effects of different market environments on 
the time at which a firm should switch from a survival to a profit orientation, my findings can 
help entrepreneurs increase their odds of surviving during the early hazardous years. My 
focus on added value to the firm and firm valuation can also help both owner and financers of 
startup businesses shape their investment deals. Indeed, by being aware of what type of 
switching time (early or late) is imposed on the entrepreneurs in different markets, business 
angels and venture capitalists can make more accurate decisions about the money they invest 
and more precise predictions of their returns on investment. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, 
can propose more realistic deals to their investors based on the market they enter. As for 
policy makers, they can be better informed on what may cause a premature orientation switch 




2. Literature Review 
Our formulation and analysis of the orientation switch touches upon multiple research 
streams. I first bring about the work on survival orientation in startup firms. I then contrast 
these studies with the work on profit orientation, which allow me to argue for the need of 
studying the timing decision to switch orientation. I also bring the literature on risk-return 
tradeoffs because such tradeoffs will result when the firm switches from a survival to a profit 
orientation. 
 
2.1. Survival versus Profit Orientation 
Scholars have considered survival as a firm’s key focus. Some have defined a 
survival-orientated firm as one that maximizes its probability of not going bankrupt (e.g., 
Dutta et al. 2001, Radner 1991). Others have associated a survival orientation to maximizing 
the probability of positive profit or, more generally, maximizing the probability that profit 
exceeds a specified threshold (e.g., Lévesque and Zhao 2009). Although firms experiencing 
positive profit on a continuous basis will typically survive (Demsetz 1996), most new 
business enterprises are unprofitable in their early years of existence due to their early costly 
strategies for growth that often focus on investing (any profits, borrowed money, and/or 
invested funds) in R&D and marketing. In addition to bankruptcy and profit exceeding a 
threshold, survival has been considered in the empirical literature as a binary variable (success 
or failure). Murphy et al. (1996) review that literature. For instance, scholars have 
investigated the relationship between success/failure and return on net worth, which is the 
ratio of after-tax income to total assets minus total liabilities (Harris and Katz 1991).   
However, Friedman (1953) argues that, to last in the market, a firm should emphasize 
profitability – a profit rather than a survival orientation, although this statement has received 
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many criticisms including one from Radner (1995) who claims that a profit maximizer will 
fail in finite time, and one from Dutta and Radner (1999) who show that an entrepreneur who 
maximizes the expected sum of discounted dividends will fail in finite time. Nevertheless, a 
profit orientation is commonly used in theory and practice, where profit is measured as sales 
revenues minus the sum of various costs. For instance, Fuller (2008) uses sales revenues 
minus production and transportation costs, where the amount of production is regulated by the 
consumer’s demand function and limited by firm capacity. Lévesque and Zhao (2009) also 
use this definition while considering the effect of a competitor’s amount of production on the 
product’s price, as well as goodwill and inventory costs. I offer in this thesis a new definition 
for a survival orientation and for a profit orientation that takes into consideration key tradeoffs 
associated with each of these two orientations.  
Radner (1995) comments that a firm’s probability of survival increases (with 
diminishing return) as that firm ages to eventually reach one. In an earlier empirical study, 
Evans (1987) finds that the positive relationship between survival and age holds for 83% of 
the studied industries. This positive relationship between the likelihood of survival and age 
suggests the existence of a time at which survival is no longer crucial. Consequently, it also 
suggests the need to understand an entrepreneur’s timing decision to switch orientation (from 
survival to profit), and the conditions under which this orientation switch might need to be 
delayed or expedited.  
 
2.2. Timing Decision for an Orientation Switch 
Timing decisions are crucial to the success of newly formed enterprises because they 
are typically irreversible, such as the timing at which to enter a market. Finding the optimal 
time at which to enter a market has received wide scholarly interest at both the theoretical 
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(modeling) and empirical levels. For instance, Armstrong and Lévesque (2002) investigate the 
time at which to stop product development activities and launch production in order to 
maximize a firm’s profit. Lévesque and Shepherd (2004) study the combination of optimal 
market entry timing and optimal level at which to imitate other firms in key practices so as to 
minimize the loss of performance.  
Benninga et al. (2005) characterize the time at which a firm should go public and the 
effect of that timing decision on firm value and associated risk. Choi et al. (2008) consider the 
level of the entrepreneur’s ignorance as a determinant for the optimal time at which to switch 
from exploring a business opportunity to exploiting it (and make a major financial 
commitment) based on maximizing a linear combination of profit, mortality risk and 
exploration costs. Others have looked at the optimal time at which to adopt a new technology 
(e.g., Dutta et al. 1999, Chambers et al. 2009). 
Nevertheless, I am unaware of works where both profit and survival orientations are 
considered in the firm’s growth process, yet sequentially rather than simultaneously. This 
approach also allows me to consider different tradeoffs than those that are most important in 
other timing literature. For instance, Jovanovic and Lach (1989) articulate a market-entry 
tradeoff by arguing that early market entry of innovative product yields a higher revenue 
stream, but delaying market entry yields lower production cost due to vicarious learning (i.e., 
learning from the actions of other firms). I instead focus on the switch-orientation tradeoff 
born from the return and the risk a firm faces as it transfers from a survival to a profit 
orientation, as described next. 
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2.3.  Risk-Return Tradeoff 
With the modern portfolio theory, one can go back to Markowitz (1952) who shows 
how a rational investor maximizes the expected return of her portfolio using diversification. 
This theory models an investment’s return as a random variable, where the variance of that 
return represents the investment risk. According to Markowitz, “the portfolio with maximum 
return is not necessarily the one with minimum variance. There is a rate at which the investor 
can gain expected return by taking on variance, or reduce variance by giving up expected 
return” (p. 79).  
Since then, numerous empirical studies have investigated the relationship between the 
risk and then return that are faced in various financial activities. Ghysels et al. (2005) support 
a strong positive relationship between risk and return in the stock market. Goyal et al. (2003) 
have studied the relationship between return from the aggregate stock market and risk as 
either the average stock variance or the market risk. They find a positive relationship between 
that return and the average stock variance, but no significant relationship between return and 
market risk. More recently, Raynor (2007) views the risk-return tradeoff as a “strategy 
paradox.” In other words, a paradox that is born from using a strategy that leads to a high 
likelihood of both significant returns and failure. Raynor suggests that a way to defeat this 
paradox may be by “creating and managing a portfolio of real options on the contingent 
elements of alternative optimal strategies” (p. 231). 
In line with this research, a survival orientation is likely to yield lower risk and lower 
return as compared to a profit orientation. I therefore offer next a mathematical model that 
characterizes conditions under which a unique time exists at which a startup firm should 
switch from a survival to a profit orientation, taking into consideration the differences in the 
 8 
risk-return tradeoff under these two orientations. When such a switch exists, this timing model 
also allows me to investigate what changes in key model parameters promote an earlier, or a 




3. Decision Model 
3.1. Narrative Description of the Timing Problem 
Let me consider a startup owner, e, deriving utility from adding value to her firm over 
the life span of that firm (e.g., up to the time it is ready to be acquired). For instance, value is 
added when e secures additional funding, when she realizes successful R&D, and/or when she 
acquires new key customers. Detail on how value is added to the firm is unimportant for my 
analysis, but the orientation of e while adding value is. A survival orientation, whereby e tries 
to maximize the likelihood of survival of the new enterprise, is selected initially. After a 
certain time, say , however, e will likely wish to grow the business and hence switch focus to 
a profit orientation and, instead, try to maximize the profitability of the new enterprise. When, 
then, should this switch take place? Figure 1 offers a schematic representation of this switch.  
 










The answer to that question is unobvious because the orientation selected by e 
determines the speed at which the firm changes its value over time. A survival orientation 
    
    
 
Profit maximization Survival maximization 
Utility maximization derived from adding value to the firm over time                                    
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most likely leads to more conservative actions and hence lower profit potential than would a 
profit orientation. e’s orientation further determines the variation in the firm’s valuation 
growth. The more conservative actions under a survival orientation likely yield lower 
“shocks” on a firm’s added value from one period to the next than a profit orientation does. 
Consequently, the risk-return combination is at smaller levels for both added value variance 
(risk) and added value expectation (return) if e is survival oriented than if she is profit 
oriented, which creates a tradeoff under both orientations.  
This description illustrates how the switching time decision may lead to improved firm 
valuation and hence its owner’s utility. The main question then becomes: Under what 
conditions will an optimal time to switch from a survival to a profit orientation exist? As 
described earlier, the timing decision will depend on the tradeoff over time between the 
expected added value to the firm and the variation of that added value. This risk-return 
tradeoff will be determined by the firm owner’s orientation. But how is the owner’s 
orientation switch identified exactly? And how would a change in any of the variables 
influencing the firm’s added value affect that switching time? Intuitive reasoning cannot 
answer these questions. However, a formal version of the simple decision model I described 
can. The next subsection translates this intuitive narrative into a simple formal utility-
maximizing decision model. 
 
3.2.  Formal Description of the Timing Problem 
Let T be the firm’s life span (e.g., the time at which it will be sold or bought out). For 
any time period t, 1 < t < T, the added value to the firm is given by  
 , (1) 
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where vt represents the baseline added value to the firm at t, and Xt is the percentage of change 
in the firm’s added value at t. Xt is assumed to be a normally distributed random variable 
whose mean and variance depend on whether the startup owner is survival oriented or profit 
oriented, as explained above. Hence, if  represents the time at which the owner switches her 
orientation, then the mean of Xt is given by  
    with   , (2) 
and its variance by 
    with   , (3) 
where the index i equals s for a survival orientation and p for a profit orientation. 
 In a sense, Xt represents the unplanned growth at t in the firm’s valuation, as opposed 
to the “planned” valuation growth via a change over time in the baseline added value vt, that 
is, . Hence, i,t is the expected unplanned growth at t and i,t the variation of that unplanned 
growth. The expected unplanned growth and its variance also captured the risk-return tradeoff 
that is paramount in my analysis of the time at which to switch from a survival to a profit 
orientation. As I articulated in the literature review section, a survival-oriented startup owner 
likely takes actions that result in a lower risk level, but also a lower return (Penrose 1994) 
than a profit-oriented one. Consequently, and , for any time period t.  
I keep the model tractable by assuming that the startup owner obeys an exponential 
utility function tt wt ewU

)( , where wt (firm added value at t) is a risky outcome (because 
Xt is uncertain) and t reflects the owner’s risk propensity at t. The owner is assumed to be 
risk averse and thus t > 0 for any t (which is consistent with existing literature, including 
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Iyigun and Owen 1998, Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979), and since she may exhibit a change in 
her risk aversion, I allow this parameter to vary over time. This utility function along with a 
normally distributed outcome (Xt and thus wt) lead to a nice property of my model: For 
alternative wt, the owner is indifferent between maximizing expected utility and selecting the 
maximum of hi(t) = Ei(wt) – ½tVari(wt), where Ei() is the expectation and Vari() the 
variance operators under orientation i, i  {s,p} (e.g., Freund 1956). 
Until the firm exits (e.g., it is sold), the startup owner must choose the timing  at 
which to switch from being survival oriented to being profit oriented in order to optimize the 
utility she gains from her firm’s valuation. Firm valuation is given by 
  (4) 
where     
and     . 
From Eq. (1), Eq. (2) and Eq. (3), this is equivalent to  
12  , 2  . 
(5) 
(Note that I verified that the discounting of utility over time can be set to 1 without a loss of 
generality.) 
I next analyze Eq. (5) to identify conditions under which a unique optimal orientation 
switch exists. This characterization is important because it allows me to discuss circumstances 
where a switch might, or not, be required. It also allows me to discuss the consequences on 
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the switching time from a change in the business environment. Appendix A provides a 
summary of the notations.  
 
3.3.  Existence of an Orientation Switch 
Based on Leibniz’s formula, 
 . (6) 
A unique optimal switching time * exists whenever  and the second order condition for 




I am now in a position to characterize a set of three sufficient (but not necessary) 
conditions for the second order condition to hold and an initial condition for , which 
will guarantee the existence of *. Specifically, Eq. (7) is satisfied if  
 , (8) 
 , (9)  
 and   . (10) 
Given Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), there exists a * for which  as long as  
 . (11)  
In other words, when comparing a profit orientation to a survival orientation, Eq. (8) requires 
an increasing behavior over time for the differential in the expected unplanned growths in 
 14 
added value. Eq. (9), instead, requires a decreasing behavior over time for the differential in 
the variation associated with these unplanned growths. The initial condition given by Eq. (11) 
guarantees that the two curves represented by the left-hand side of Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) are 
crossing, yielding a non-negative value of *. 
Eq. (10) sets conditions on the behavior of the startup owner’s risk propensity and of 
her firm added value. For instance, if the owner becomes more risk averse as she develops her 
startup (i.e., ), then she will need to face a firm that experiences a decrease in its 
(baseline) added value, otherwise the switch might not be guaranteed. At a first glance, 
however, one would instead expect that the startup owner becomes less risk averse as time 
goes by as she learn and gain confidence; that is, . Also, a pre-requisite for the desire 
to maximize profit and the switching time to occur is likely to be that the firm’s added value 
grows over time and, as a result, . Taken together, these conditions mean that the 
startup owner becomes less risk averse as the fortune of the firm increases, which finds 
support in the literature (e.g., Shapira and March 1992, Walls et al. 1996).  
The benefit of characterizing conditions for an orientation switch is that it allows me 
to conduct scenario analysis where these conditions hold, or not, under various model 
assumptions. I analyze such scenarios by first noting that they are differentiated by the 
behavior over the startup’s development (i.e., time) of the (1) differential from a profit to a 
survival orientation in the rates of growth in the (expected) unplanned added value (i.e., Eq. 
8), (2) differential from a profit to a survival orientation in the rates-of-growth variation in the 
unplanned added value (i.e., Eq. 9), (3) evolution of the planned added value, and (4) the 
evolution of the entrepreneur’s risk propensity. Table 1 offers examples of dimensions that 
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are environment driven – for (1) and (2) – and individual driven – for (3) and (4) – in order to 
characterize when the sign of these four behaviors should be negative or positive. 
 
Table 1. Exemplifying the behavior of the four key characteristics 
Sign of + – 
  
When the size of the market is large and a 
profit orientation leads to greater investment in 
marketing efforts. (cell 1.1) 
When the size of the market is small and a 
profit orientation leads to lesser investment 
in marketing efforts. (cell 1.2) 
  
When the firm’s product is high-tech and a 
profit orientation leads to greater investment in 
risky R&D efforts. (cell 2.1) 
When the firm’s product is low-tech and a 
profit orientation leads to lesser investment 
in risky R&D efforts. (cell 2.3) 
  
When the entrepreneur can convince outside 
investors to continuously inject money in the 
business. (cell 3.1) 
When the entrepreneur cannot convince 
outside investors to continuously inject 
money in the business. (cell 3.2) 
  
When the entrepreneur becomes more risk 
averse over time. (cell 4.1) 
When the entrepreneur becomes less risk 
averse over time. (cell 4.2) 
 
In Table 1, Cell 1.1 represents a business environment where the change over time in 
the expected unplanned growth in added value under a survival orientation is exceeded by the 
change over time in that growth under a profit orientation. In a good economy, these changes 
are likely to be positive (i.e., faster rates of growth, or convexity), whereas in a bad economy 
they could be negative (slower rates of growth, or concavity). But regardless of the state of 
the economy, that condition on the expected unplanned growth in a firm’s added value can be 
satisfied when, for instance, the new enterprise enters a large market (e.g., local, national or 
international customers can easily be attracted to that market) because more opportunities 
become available to the profit-oriented entrepreneur. Indeed, over time a profit-oriented 
entrepreneur would likely invest (hers or others’ money) more in marketing efforts than a 
survival-oriented entrepreneur would, and hence be able to capture greater shares of that large 
market, resulting in larger changes of its added-value growth. Cell 1.2, on the other hands, 
corresponds to an environment where the change over time in the expected unplanned growth 
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in added value under a survival orientation exceeds the change over time in that growth under 
a profit orientation. In this case, note that, since , the differential  
decreases and the two expected unplanned growths in added value are getting closer over 
time; in other words, the orientation no longer matters, everything else being equal. This can 
now be the case when the new enterprise faces limited demand (e.g., the product is only of 
interest to a minority) because the small market size would limit the benefits of relatively 
larger investments from the profit-oriented entrepreneur.  
Cell 2.1 represents a business environment where the change over time in the variation 
of the unplanned-added-value growth under a survival orientation is exceeded by the change 
over time in that variation under a profit orientation. It can be the case, for instance, with 
high-tech products where the rapid change of technology over time requires more risky 
investments. Indeed, over time a profit-oriented entrepreneur would likely invest (hers or 
others’ moneys) more in R&D than a survival-oriented entrepreneur would and hence 
encounter more technological challenges, resulting in larger changes in the variation in its 
added-value growth. Cell 2.2, on the other hands, corresponds to an environment where the 
change over time in the variation of the unplanned growth in the firm’s added value under a 
survival orientation exceeds the change over time in that variation under a profit orientation. 
This can now be the case when the new enterprise focuses on low-tech products because it 
would limit the potential damages associated with relatively larger R&D investments from the 
profit-oriented entrepreneur.  
Cell 3.1 represents an individual who plans to increase over time the (baseline) added 
value, which is non-random and hence viewed as an individual-based construct. That added 
value can be increased over time when, for instance, the startup owner’s talent and charisma 
 17 
allow her to convince potential investors (e.g., angels and/or venture capitalists) to 
continuously inject money in the business. Cell 3.2 represents an individual who plans to 
decrease over time that added value, which can be the case when the startup owner chooses to 
“wean” herself from the dependence of outside investment and less and less additional money 
is injected in the firm over time. Cell 4.1 and cell 4.2 represent an individual who becomes 
either more or, respectively, less risk averse over time. 
Table 2 portrays the 16 potential combinations based on the signs of the key behaviors 
exemplified in Table 1 from cell 1.1 to cell 4.2. To better illustrate the potential of Table 2, I 
discuss a few of the most representative of these 16 scenarios. I begin with Scenario 8 where 
the existence of an optimal switching time is ensured because the objective function in Eq. (5) 
is concave (assuming Eq. 11 holds). This is expected, for instance, in a business environment 
where the size of the market is large and the product is low-tech (as for many consumer 
goods), but where the startup owner cannot convince outside investors to continuously inject 
money in the business as she becomes less risk averse over time. 
On the opposite side of the spectrum lies Scenario 16, where an optimal switching 
time does not exist, or it is immediate and a profit orientation should be adopted at the 
inception of the firm, because the objective function in Eq. (5) is convex. This scenario 
occurs, for instance, in a business environment where the size of the market is small, the 
product is high-tech, and the startup owner can convince outside investors to continuously 
inject money in the business as she becomes more risk averse over time. 
 
 18 
Table 2. Scenario analysis on the existence of an optimal switching time 
Scenario 







        
1 + – + – It depends 
Yes if Eq. (10) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the entrepreneur becomes less risk averse over 
time is fast enough to overcome the weighted rate at which the firm’s 
baseline added value improves over time 
2 + + + – It depends 
Yes if Eq. (7) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the differential unplanned added value increases 
is sufficiently high to obtain concavity 
3 + – + + It depends 
Yes if Eq. (7) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the differential unplanned added value increases 
is sufficiently high to obtain concavity 
4 + + + + It depends 
Yes if Eq. (7) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the differential unplanned added value increases 
is sufficiently high to obtain concavity 
5 + – – + It depends 
Yes if Eq. (10) holds  
 
E.g., when the rate at which the entrepreneur becomes more risk averse over 
time is slow enough to be overcome by the weighted rate at which the firm’s 
baseline added value deteriorates over time 
6 + + – – It depends 
Yes if –  
 
E.g., when the rate at which the entrepreneur becomes less risk averse over 
time is fast enough to overcome the weighted rate at which the variation of 
unplanned added value improves over time 
7 + + – + It depends 
Yes if  Eq. (7) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the differential unplanned added value increases 
is sufficiently high to obtain concavity 
8 + – – – Yes Not applicable – the objective function in Eq. (5) is concave 
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9 – – + – It depends 
Yes if Eq. (7) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the differential unplanned added value 
decreases is sufficiently small to obtain concavity 
10 – – – + It depends 
Yes if Eq. (7) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the differential unplanned added value 
decreases is sufficiently small to obtain concavity 
11 – + – – It depends 
Yes if Eq. (7) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the differential unplanned added value 
decreases is sufficiently small to obtain concavity 
12 – – – – It depends 
Yes if Eq. (7) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the differential unplanned added value 
decreases is sufficiently small to obtain concavity 
13 – + + – It depends 
Yes if Eq. (7) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the differential unplanned added value 
decreases is sufficiently small to obtain concavity 
14 – – + + It depends 
Yes if Eq. (7) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the differential unplanned added value 
decreases is sufficiently small to obtain concavity 
15 – + – + It depends 
Yes if Eq. (7) holds 
 
E.g., when the rate at which the differential unplanned added value 
decreases is sufficiently small to obtain concavity 





The other scenarios are less straightforward because whether or not an orientation switch 
should occur becomes conditional. Scenario 1, for instance, can characterize an environment 
where the size of the market is large, the product is low-tech, the startup owner can convince 
outside investors to continuously inject money in the business as she becomes less risk averse 
over time. However, in that scenario the rate at which the entrepreneur becomes less risk averse 
over time is required to be fast enough to overcome the weighted rate at which the firm’s 
baseline added value improves over time (i.e., Eq. 10 holds true to obtain concavity for the 
objective function in Eq. 5). The rationale for this additional condition is that the entrepreneur 
may be discouraged to switch to a profit orientation and face more risk (i.e., variation in 
unplanned-added-value) when she can easily obtain money to be injected in the firm. But this 
outcome can be overcome by the entrepreneur becoming rapidly less and less risk averse over 
time. Similarly, Scenario 5 can characterize an environment where the size of the market is large, 
the product is low-tech, but the startup owner cannot convince outside investors to continuously 
inject money in the business as she becomes more risk averse over time. In that scenario, the rate 
at which the entrepreneur becomes more risk averse over time is required to be slow enough to 






4. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
4.1.  Earlier versus Later Orientation Switch 
 When a unique optimal switching time exists, I am able to discuss the consequence on 
that switching time from a change in a key model construct. But to do so, I need to add some 
structures to the decision problem. In order words, I must specify the functional form of the 
planned (baseline) added value to the firm (vt), the expected unplanned growth (i,t) in added 
value under both orientations, the variation of that unplanned growth (i,t) under both 
orientations, and the risk propensity (t). Specifically, I investigate whether the switch from a 
survival orientation to a profit orientation should occur earlier or later when there is an increase 
in a parameter on which these functional forms depend. 
 For simplicity of exposition, I use linear functions. Let 
; 
   and   ; 
   and  ; 
. 
From a comparative statics analysis (e.g., Varian 1992: 492), with a change in any parameter  , 
the optimal switching time * changes according to  









































































































































































































. I next present formally 
and discuss these relationships. 
 
Proposition 1 (added value and switching time). The time at which to switch from a 
survival orientation to a profit orientation should be later with an increase in 
(a) the initial (t = 0) added value to the firm (i.e., av is increased);  
(b) the marginal baseline added value to the firm (i.e., bv is increased); 











but a decrease in 











Part (a) and part (b) of Proposition 1 refer to a situation in which an increase in the 
baseline added value delays the switching time, everything else being equal. The reason for this 
positive relationship stands from the fact this (riskless) added value can compensate for lower 
returns under a survival orientation, which results in a longer time period at which the firm can 
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afford a survival orientation. In part (c) and part (d), an increase in the expected unplanned 
growth in added value under a survival orientation also delays the switching time from a survival 
to a profit orientation, everything else being equal. This is the case because, again, this increased 
growth in added value can compensate for lower returns. In part (e) and part (f), on the other 
hand, the firm can afford a survival orientation for a longer period of time when it experiences a 
decrease in the expected unplanned growth in added value under a profit orientation because 
profit orientation then becomes less attractive.  
 
Proposition 2 (added value variation and switching time). The time at which to switch 
from a survival orientation to a profit orientation should be later with an increase in 















but a decrease in 















In part (a) and part (b) of Proposition 2, when the variation in the unplanned growth in 
added value under a profit orientation increases, everything else being equal, switching to a 
profit orientation becomes less attractive and the entrepreneur should wait because it faces less 
risk under a profit orientation. What also makes the switch less attractive, as in part (c) and part 
(d), is a decrease in the variation in the unplanned growth in added value under a survival 
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orientation. The next proposition is intuitive since a more risk-averse startup owner will be less 
attracted to switch as she will face more risk under a profit orientation. 
 
Proposition 3 (risk propensity and switching time). The time at which to switch from a 
survival orientation to a profit orientation should be later with an increase in  
(a) the initial risk propensity (i.e., a
 
is increased); 




4.2.  The Effects of Franchising 
To illustrate how Propositions 1 to 3 can be used, I investigate if the orientation switch 
should occur earlier or later when the entrepreneur is a franchisee as compared to being a 
franchisor. A franchise is “[a] form of business organization in which a firm which already has a 
successful product or service (the franchisor) enters into a continuing contractual relationship 
with other businesses (franchisees) operating under the franchisor’s trade name and usually with 
the franchisor’s guidance, in exchange for a fee” (investorwords.com). One of the recognized 
key differences between being a franchisee and a franchisor (i.e., an independent business 
owner) is the lower risk of failure faced by franchisees (e.g., Castrogiovanni et al. 1993). Unlike 
the franchisor that can provide new offerings, franchisees must limit their level of innovativeness 
(Kaufmann and Dant 1999) and as such are likely to experience less risk (Hisrich et al., 2006). 
For instance, they face less production risk as the product is already developed for them, or less 
marketing risk as the market has already been identified for them. For the franchisor, on the other 
hand, an important advantage is her ability to grow rapidly. 
Therefore, in the context of my decision framework, I first observe that a franchisee faces 
less variation in the unplanned-added-value growth under both orientations than the franchisor 
does. Second, the franchisee’s unplanned-added-value growth under a survival orientation is 
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higher than that of the franchisor because, by taking advantage of the trade name, the franchisee 
needs not to introduce the product to the market. However, the franchisor’s unplanned-added-
value growth under a profit orientation is higher than that of the franchisee since the former faces 
higher growth opportunities. Third, at least initially, franchisees are expected to be more risk 
averse than franchisors since they chose a type of business where they face less risk (Morrison et 
al. 1999). Table 3 summarizes the impacts of these observations based on Propositions 1 to 3 and 
proposed that the franchisee switches from a survival to a profit orientation later then the 
entrepreneur. Note that, since I have no evidence to support whether the franchisee’s rate of 
change in risk propensity over time or the planned added value are distinct from that of the 
franchisor, these parameters are assumed to be of comparable values.  
 
Table 3. Orientation switch and franchising 
       
             
Franchisee  D D D D D D E E D NA NA NA 
Franchisor E E E E E E D D E NA NA NA 
E: expedite;    D: delay  
 
Propositions 1 to 3 can also be used to investigate the behavior of the firm’s total 
valuation as changes occur in a key model parameter. This investigation cannot, however, be 
done analytically given the need for a closed-form solution for the optimal switching time, which 
must be incorporated into the objective function of the startup owner. Nevertheless, it can be 
done numerically to provide some conjectures on the sensitivity of a firm’s total valuation. I 





5. Firm Valuation Behavior: A Simulation Approach 
5.1. Simulation Specifics 
In this section I investigate the effect of key model parameters on the total valuation of 
the firm based on Scenario 8 in Table 2 (to ensure the existence of an optimal switching time). 
The optimal switching time is obtained from maximizing the total utility gained by the added 
value to the firm over the planning horizon [0,T]. I use MATLAB to simulate added firm values 
and utility accumulation over time (the detailed coding appears in Appendix B). The continuous 
accumulation of added firm values is represented by the summation of discrete time periods 
, i.e. T = 100. A time period t can be thought of as the number of months, which 
yields a horizon of a little over 8 years. For each analysis presented below, the simulation is 
repeated 100 times and I take the average value of total valuation over these 100 runs. 
I selected numerical values for the parameters that were consistent with data on 5000 
newly established enterprises, as per Inc. Magazine (2008). The median amount of capital used 
to launch these businesses was USD$25,000, which I use as the initial valuation (to be added to 
the accumulated firm’s added values wt). The median growth rate of these firms was 147% over 
three years, which yields a monthly average added value of about USD$320 (
). This amount was used to estimate the average added value over 
the 100 periods, which allowed me to find a reasonable set of numerical values for av, bv, ,  
,  and . These values are offered in Table 4, along with the variation parameters, ,  
,  and . For risk propensity ( ), Freund (1956: p.258) comments that “[t]he estimation 
of the risk aversion constant  is a purely subjective task, and any chosen value is exceedingly 
difficult to defend.” To keep the analysis manageable I assumed  to be constant over time and, 
to ensure proper calibration, I conducted a preliminary analysis (please refer to Appendix C for 
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details) to find the best possible values for  to be 1. In other words, the values for a and b are 
1 and 0, respectively.  
 
Table 4. Selected parameter values for the base case 
Parameters Value Value range 
 0.6 NA 
 0.0015 0.001 to 0.002 
 0.7 NA 
 0.002 0.0015 to 0.0025 
 0.003 NA 
 0.0003 0.00028 to 0.0003049 
 0.005 NA 
 0.000285 0.00028 to 0.0003075 
av 200 150 to 220 
bv -0.5 NA 
a 1 NA 
b 0 NA 
*units are in dollars  
 
5.2. Analysis 
Figure 2 suggests a positive relationship between total valuation and the initial planned 
added value av, everything else being equal. This positive relationship is expected because an 
increase in av pushes upward the accumulated valuation at any time periods. As a result, 
regardless on when the orientation switch occurs, total valuation is improved. Therefore, startup 
owners who are able, for instance, to initially secure more funding are expected to experience 




Figure 2. Total valuation and planned added value 
 
 
In Figure 3(a), an increase in the marginal expected unplanned growth in added value 
under a survival orientation 
s
b  pushes down total valuation, everything else being equal. The 
rational for this behavior goes as follows. An increase in the marginal expected unplanned 
growth in added value under a survival orientation encourages the startup owner to switch 
orientation later than before that increase (Proposition 1d). Consequently, the larger unplanned 
growth in added values faced under a profit orientation start later and the summation of firm 
valuations over time augments at a slower pace than prior to that increase in , resulting in a 
smaller total valuation. Startup owners who can grow their firm value faster under a survival 
orientation are thus advised to stick longer to their survival focus (because it provides them with 
more utilities, which not only takes returns/valuation in to consideration but also risk), but at the 
cost of experiencing a smaller valuation for their firms when comes time to exit.  
In Figure 3(b), on the other hand, an increase in the marginal expected unplanned growth 
in added value under a profit orientation  pushes upward total valuation, everything else 
being equal. First, I note that there will be an earlier orientation switch when  is increased 
(Proposition 1f). Consequently, the larger unplanned growth in added values faced under a profit 
























orientation start earlier and the summation of firm valuations over time augments at a faster pace 
than prior to that increase in , resulting in a larger total valuation. Startup owners who can 
grow their firm value faster under a profit orientation are thus advised to not stick as long to a 
survival focus (because it provides them with less utilities), but even at the cost of facing more 
risk they will experience higher valuation for their firms when comes time to exit. 
Note that the fluctuations in total variation with respect to a change in these marginal 
growths in expected unplanned-added-value growth are more pronounced under a survival than a 
profit orientation. The reason lies in the fact that, to satisfy the sufficient conditions for concavity 
(Table 2), the variation in the unplanned-added-value growth under a survival orientation 
exceeds that variation under a profit orientation.  
 
Figure 3. Total valuation and marginal expected unplanned added value growth 
 
(a) under a survival orientation          (b) under a profit orientation 
  
 
Lastly, Figure 4 portrays the behavior of total valuation when the marginal variation in 
unplanned-added-value growth changes. In Figure 4(a), an increase in that marginal variation 
under a survival orientation ( ) boosts the total valuation, although at a diminishing rate. The 














































rationale for this behavior goes as follows. An increase in  encourages the startup owner to 
switch orientation earlier than before that increase (Proposition 2d). Since the startup owner 
enjoys higher unplanned-added-value growth under a profit orientation, this earlier switching 
time allows for a larger expected accumulation of added values, and hence a higher total 
valuation. As for the decreasing returns, note that, as  increases enough for the variation in 
unplanned-added-value growth under a survival orientation to reach the level of that variation 
under a profit orientation, the benefit to total valuation starts to wash out. Startup owners who 
face more volatility in the value that can be added to their firm under a survival orientation are 
thus advised to not stick as long to their survival focus as those who face less volatility (because 
they can now afford to let go of the lesser returns under the survival orientation), and enjoy an 
expected higher valuation for their firms when comes time to exit. 
In Figure 4(b), on the other hand, an increase in that marginal variation in unplanned-
added-value growth under a profit orientation ( ) damages the total valuation. This is the case 
because an increase in  encourages the startup owner to switch orientation later than before 
that increase (Proposition 2b). Since again the startup owner enjoys higher unplanned-added-
value growth under a profit orientation, this later switching time results in a slower expected 
accumulation of added values, and hence a lower total valuation. However, when that variation 
becomes quite large, the orientation switch from survival to profit never takes place (i.e., * = 
100) and the total valuation stabilizes to its lowest value (because valuation accumulates slower 
under a survival orientation). Startup owners who face more volatility in the value that can be 
added to their firm under a profit orientation are thus advised to stick longer with their survival 
focus and face a lesser risk, but at the cost of experiencing a smaller valuation for their firms 




Figure 4. Total valuation and marginal variation in unplanned added value growth 
 



























































My thesis can potentially contribute to the current debate on entrepreneurial goals. How 
to define an individual’s objective function has been identified by Burmeister et al. (2008) as one 
of the key challenges in future entrepreneurship research. Should the objective be economic 
(e.g., profit or survival maximization, or a combination of both) or a life perspective (e.g., 
happiness maximization, although not as straightforward to measure as profit or survival)? In 
fact, most decision makers are likely to consider more than one perspective. In this thesis, I 
moved a step further by suggesting that, in the early years, there should be an orientation switch, 
that is, sequentially as opposed to simultaneously considering both survival and profit 
maximization. 
In addition, employing risk-return tradeoffs to characterize the two orientations is, to the 
best of my knowledge, unprecedented in the entrepreneurial context I have explored. Moreover, 
considering sequentially a survival and then profit orientations to study firm added value over 
time and the resulting accumulated total valuation contributes to the literature on firm growth. 
Paying more attention to the characterization of each of the two orientations – survival and profit 
– and linking these orientations to firm growth open up new avenues for research in 
entrepreneurial decision making.   
 
6.2. Practical Implications 
Entrepreneurship plays a key role in economic growth (Minniti and Lévesque, in press). 
Firms are likely to grow faster under a profit orientation, yet, based on the findings herein, some 
environmental and entrepreneurial characteristics discourage entrepreneurs to make the switch 
from a survival to a profit orientation. Governments and policy makers can, to some extent, 
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shape the business environment to be more conducive to a switch. These incentives must help 
make the profit orientation more attractive by reducing the risk-return tradeoff faced by profit-
oriented entrepreneurs. Financial capital could limit the risk whereas affordable marketing 
services could help boost the return.  
Further, investors such as angels and venture capitalists can select the business 
opportunities in which to invest based on new information provided in this thesis. Investors can 
evaluate the environmental and entrepreneurial characteristics I put forward and regulate the 
planned added value according to the switching time they desire. For entrepreneurs, one key 
implication is the recognition that a time at which to switch orientation may or may not exist.  
 
6.3. Opportunities for future work 
Based on my review of the entrepreneurship and related literature, studies of business 
startups’ orientation are few, and none have focused on an optimal switching time from a 
survival to a profit orientation. Considering the importance of survival in the early years of a 
firm, fruitful research questions that currently limit the scope of my thesis include: In the 
proposed framework, what if a profit orientation is replaced by a growth orientation? How would 
it affect the risk-return tradeoff I have put forward based on supporting literature? How would 
the sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal switching time be altered?   
Another limitation lies in the way I handle constraints in the optimization problem by 
assuming that there are none. In reality, firms are constrained by their capacity, managerial 
abilities, geographical limits, to name a few, and acknowledging these constraints would likely 
modify my findings. Also, adding a competitor would increase the potential from this research, 
as most entrepreneurial firms live in a highly competitive business environment. The presence of 
a competing firm could encourage the focal firm to switch its orientation earlier in order to grab 
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market share. In this context, game theory would be the approach of choice. Finally, an empirical 
test of the relationships I theoretically put forward between the switching time and key model 
parameters, and of the behavior of firm total valuation I portrayed, could significantly strengthen 
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Appendix A. Notation summary 
Table A1. Notation summary 
 
Notation Description 
  Switching time from a survival to a profit orientation 
T Firm exit time (e.g., from being sold) 
  Expected unplanned growth at t in added value under a survival orientation 
  Expected unplanned growth at t in added value under a profit orientation 
  Variation in the unplanned growth at t in added value under a survival 
orientation 
  Variation in the unplanned growth at t in added value under a profit orientation 
  Planned added value at t 
  Risk propensity at t 
 Initial expected unplanned growth in added value under survival orientation 
 Marginal expected unplanned growth in added value under a survival orientation 
 Initial variation in the unplanned growth in added value under a survival 
orientation 
 Marginal variation in the unplanned growth in added value under a survival 
orientation 
  Initial expected unplanned growth in added value under a profit orientation 
  Marginal expected unplanned growth in added value under a profit orientation 
 Initial variation in the unplanned growth in added value under a profit 
orientation 
  Marginal variation in the unplanned growth in added value under a profit 
orientation 
  Initial planned added value  
   Marginal baseline planned added value  
   Initial risk propensity  




Appendix B. Coding for numerical analysis 





















































if (t>1) && (u(t,1)>u(t-1,1)) 
tau(i,h)= t; 
end, 


























































































B.3. Coding for the relationship between total valuation and marginal expected unplanned 







































































B.4. Coding for the relationship between total valuation and marginal expected unplanned 





































































B.5. Coding for the relationship between total valuation and marginal variation in the 





































































B.6. Coding for the relationship between total valuation and marginal variation in the 









































































Appendix C. Estimating the best interval of values for risk propensity 
This exercise allows me to find a value for risk propensity that will yield some sensitivity 
for the total valuation function when it is investigated as changes occur in a key model 
parameter. For this to happen, the switching time must not be 1 or 100. For a given set of 
parameter values, an interval of values for risk propensity is considered too small when the 
corresponding optimal switching time stays fixed as the value of risk propensity changes. Also, a 
risk propensity interval is considered too large when the corresponding optimal switching times 
change too drastically. Table 6 offers some examples of risk propensity intervals and the 
corresponding optimal switching times. The interval [0,0.0001] is considered too small, whereas 
the interval [0,1000] is considered too large.  
 







The startup owner is too much of a risk taker and the interval is small so there is 
merely one value for the optimal switching time and that is the first period  
[0,0.001]  
The startup owner is too much of a risk taker and the interval is small so there is 
merely one value for the optimal switching time and that is the first period 
[0,0.01]  
The startup owner is too much of a risk taker and the interval is small so there is 
merely one value for the optimal switching time and that is the first period 
[0,0.1]  
The startup owner is too much of a risk taker and the interval is small so there is 
merely one value for the optimal switching time and that is the first period 
[0,1]  
The size of the interval is proper so a range of optimal switching times are 
obtained. 
[0,10]  
The size of the interval is proper so a range of optimal switching times are 
obtained. Although the switching times are spread over [1,100], more than half 
of optimal switching times are the ending period (t = 100). 
[0,100]  
The startup owner is too risk averse and the interval is too wide so the majority 
of optimal switching times are the last period. 
[0,1000]  
The startup owner is too risk averse and the interval is too wide so the majority 
of optimal switching times are the last period. 
[0,10000]  
The startup owner is too risk averse and the interval is too wide so the majority 
of optimal switching times are the last period. 
 
To find a proper risk propensity interval (value), I ran the simulation for the following 
nine different intervals: , k{-4,-3,-2,-1,0,1,2,3,4}. For each interval, 50 values of 
55 
 
risk propensity are equally spread, with 100 runs of simulation for each of these 50 values. I 
focus on those intervals that are not considered too small or too large interval, as per my 
explanation above. I chose the intervals that exhibited the most variability (i.e., the least 
repetitiveness) in the 50 optimal switching times (one for each of the 50 values of risk 
propensity ). The best intervals were [0,1] and [0,10]. I therefore chose the risk propensity  to 
be 1 (which corresponded to a switching * = 42). 
